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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the question 
certified by the Federal District Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1)(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented by the certified question is 
whether the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County has 
the authority to discharge an assistant of the County Sheriff 
who was appointed by the Sheriff with the approval of the 
Commissioner. As this is an original proceeding in this Court, 
there is no prior decision of which review is sought. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7 (Rep.Vol. 2B 1987), is the 
only statute which requires interpretation to determine the 
question certified. That statute, as it existed during the 
time at issue in this matter, provided as follows: 
Every county, precinct or district officer, 
except a county commissioner or a judicial 
officer, may, by and with the consent of the 
board of county commissioners, appoint as 
many deputies and assistants as may be 
necessary for the prompt and faithful 
discharge of the duties of his office; but 
the board shall allow the clerk of the 
district court and circuit court in those 
counties where the county clerk serves both 
courts, such deputies and assistants to 
transact the business pertaining to the 
district courts and circuit courts as may be 
deemed necessary and advisable by the judge 
- i _ 
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or judges of the district and circuit 
court. The appointment of a deputy must be 
made in writing and filed in the office of 
the county clerk. Until such appointment is 
so made and filed and until such deputy 
shall have taken the oath of office, no one 
shall be or act as such deputy. Any officer 
appointing any deputy shall be liable for 
all official acts of such deputy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The certified question arises in the context of a 
civil rights action filed by Tina McCourt pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, wherein she has alleged her constructive discharge from 
employment with the Carbon County Sheriff's Office, effected by 
the County's Board of Commissioners, constituted a deprivation 
of property without due process. In considering the issues 
raised by that claim, Judge Jenkins has sought the guidance of 
this Court in determining whether, as a matter of state law, 
the Board of County Commissions has the authority to dismiss an 
assistant of another elected county officer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only facts necessary to this Court's response to 
the certified question are as follows: 
1 ••-..•• Tina McCourt was hired by Carbon County Sheriff 
Barry Bryner, with the approval of the Board of County 
Commissioners, in June of 1987 to serve as a dispatcher in the 
Sheriff's Office. (R. Vol. I, Tab 55, p. 8.) 
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2. On November 23, 1987, the Board of Commissioners 
purported to terminate Ms. McCourt's employment with the 
Sheriff. (R. at Vol. I, Tab 1, p. 2.) 
The additional factual assertions contained in 
petitioner's brief are irrelevant to the question presented, 
which involves only a determination of the statutory powers of 
the County Commissioners, not the factual background against 
which those powers are exercised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has repeatedly held that the Board of 
County Commissioners has no authority to suspend or dismiss an 
employee appointed by the duly elected County Sheriff with the 
approval of the Commissioners. The right to dismiss flows from 
the right to appoint and can only be exercised by the officer 
empowered by statute to appoint assistants. As the statute 
which authorized county officers to employ deputies and 
assistants expressly denies such power to county commissioners, 
it is manifest that the absence of the power to appoint equates 
to the absence of the power to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
ONLY THE SHERIFF CAN DISMISS INDIVIDUALS APPOINTED BY 
THE SHERIFF WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS 
The question certified by the United States District 
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Court has, in fact, been previously answered by this Court on 
three separate occasions. In Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. 
Board of Commissioners, 71 Utah 593, 268 p. 783 (1928), this 
Court noted that the office of county sheriff is an elective 
office, like that of county commissioner, and that in the 
discharge of his duties the sheriff acts independently of the 
commissioners, and not under their control, except as otherwise 
specified by state statute. As the law authorizes a sheriff to 
appoint deputies or assistants, with approval of the 
commissioners, 
whatever summary power of suspension or 
removal of a deputy may be exercised is to 
be exercised by the sheriff and not by the 
board of county commissioners . . . 
268 p. at 785. 
This Court went on to note that the Board of 
Commissioners can reduce the number of positions the sheriff 
can fill by appointment, but cannot designate which individual 
will be removed as a result of a reduction in the size of the 
sheriffs approved staff. If the number of approved 
appointments is reduced 
then we think it would be within the 
province of the sheriff to indicate which of 
his deputies were to be retained and which 
dismissed . . . 
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268 P. at 785. Without deciding what the exact range of 
options may be for removing an officer or his appointees, this 
Court indicated that it 
is enough to now decide, as we do, that the 
board of county commissioners have no power 
to summarily suspend or remove the 
[sheriff's] deputies . . . 
268 P. at 786. 
This holding was reaffirmed in Fowler v. Gillman, 76 
Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (1930), and Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 
P.2d 772 (Utah 1984). 
The petitioner's suggestion that "Carbon County" has 
specific authority to appoint personnel (Brief of Petitioner at 
p. 14), is, while accurate, wholly unresponsive to the issue 
presented by the certified question. It presumes, 
inaccurately, that the power of the County and its Board of 
Commissioners are equivalent. The presumption is not only 
erroneous, in the context of the County's employment practices 
it is directly contrary to the very statute which authorizes 
the County to hire employees other than officers. It is 
somewhat disingenuous to argue, as petitioner's do, that the 
Commissioners have an "implied" right to hire, and therefore 
fire, any county employee when the very statute they cite as 
support for such implicit authority says that all county 
officers except commissioners and judicial officers can appoint 
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deputies and assistants. Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7 permits the 
County to hire employees appointed by its officers other than 
the commissioners. The commissioners cannot appoint assistants 
for themselves or any other officer. Accordingly, they cannot 
fire the assistants of other officers. As expressly noted by 
this Court in Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772, 773 (Utah 
1984), "the power to suspend or dismiss is appurtenant to the 
power to appoint." 
As the Commissioners are expressly exempted from the 
class of county officers who have the power to appoint 
assistants, no great powers of deduction are required to 
conclude they also lack the power to dismiss such assistants. 
In an effort to avoid this Court's precise holding in 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, supra, the petitioners suggest 
that it was somehow modified by Fowler v. Gillman, supra. The 
argument advanced is that although Fowler explicitly holds that 
the Board of County Commissioners cannot "dismiss" individuals 
appointed by the sheriff by taking actions to see to it that 
they are not paid (which is precisely what was done in this 
case), there is "dicta" in the opinion implying that the 
Commissioners can do so if they are convinced the appointed 
individual is a "bad" employee. To support this argument 
petitioners draw attention to language in the opinion which 
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says that an individual appointed in conformity with the 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7, is appointed for the term of 
the appointing officer unless his earlier dismissal is 
warranted for good cause. (See Brief of Petitioner at p. 18.) 
The petitioners then make a leap of faith and assert that such 
language means that the Commissioners can dismiss an appointee 
for cause prior to the expiration of the sheriffs term. This 
leap is illogical. It is obviously the appointing officer who 
has the authority to effect such a dismissal for cause prior to 
the expiration of his term of office. Not surprisingly, that 
is exactly what this Court indicated in Hutchinson, supra, when 
it noted that the very language in Fowler quoted by the 
petitioners in this case meant that the "sheriff may dismiss a 
deputy where the deputy 'has been guilty of misconduct . . .'" 
692 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added). 
In short, there is no statutory authority empowering 
the Board of Commissioners to dismiss an assistant appointed by 
the County Sheriff and this Court has held on three separate 
occasions that it is the Sheriff, and the Sheriff alone, who 
has such authority to act on behalf of the County. 
Just as the Sheriff, an elected officer of the County, 
could not fire an assistant appointed by the County Clerk or 
Treasurer, no matter how convinced he was of that person's 
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incompetence or immoral behavior, so too the Commissioners 
cannot exercise authority in excess of their delegated powers. 
A sheriff cannot lawfully interfere with the commissioners in 
the discharge of their duties even if the sheriff knows for a 
fact of their incompetence. The same is true of the 
commissioners in relation to the sheriff. Disputes about the 
quality of service of elected county officials are resolved at 
the ballot box or through the statutorily prescribed removal 
procedures. They cannot be resolved by Commission fiat, no 
matter how sincerely the Commissioners believe that their cause 
is just. 
The petitioners repeatedly stress that Ms. McCourt was 
an "unsworn" appointee of the Sheriff. This is of no 
significance. The same statute governs the appointment of 
deputies and assistants and petitioners cite no authority 
suggesting any basis for differentiating between these types of 
employees when determining who has the authority to suspend or 
discipline appointees. 
The entire basis for the petitioner's actions in this 
matter was their personal belief that the Sheriff of Carbon 
County was doing a bad job and conducting himself improperly. 
There is no question that county commissioners lack the 
authority to "fire" the duly elected Sheriff. See Argyle v. 
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Wright, 63 Utah 184, 224 P. 649 (1924). The procedure for 
involuntary removal of a county officer is statutory. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-6-1 et se£. (Rep.Vol. 8B 1990.) 
If the Commissioners deemed the Sheriffs malfeasance 
to warrant his removal, they should have followed this 
procedure. Having failed to do so, they lacked any authority 
to interfere with the Sheriff's discharge of his duties. 
While petitioners have asserted that one of the 
sources of their "implied" power to discharge a Sheriff's 
office employee stems from their statutory right to supervise 
other county officers, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-19 
(Rep.Vol. 2B 1987), this section has been held not to grant the 
Commissioners any responsibility over assistants or deputies of 
other county officers. In Smith v. Hill, 510 F.Supp. 767 
(D. Utah 1981), it was held that this section gives the 
Commissioners 
discretion to supervise the conduct of a 
county [officer], but not his deputy. 
Apparently, the person solely responsible 
for the supervision of a deputy is the 
[county officer] himself. 
510 F.Supp. at 776. 
Since the time of statehood, it has been recognized 
that county commissioners "can exercise such powers only as are 
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by 
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the statutes . . . " Carbon County v. Hamilton, 48 Utah 503, 
160 P. 765, 768 (1916). Petitioner's argument of "necessary 
implication" is that if they did not act to supervise the 
Sheriff's assistants the County would be without power to do 
so. This argument ignores the obvious. The County has the 
power to supervise the Sheriff's employees. It exercises that 
power through the Sheriff, and the Sheriff alone. Accordingly, 
the Board of Commissioner's attempt to usurp this authority is 
unlawful and the question certified should be answered in the 
negative. 
CONCLUSION 
Stripped of its unnecessary factual baggage, the 
simple question presented in this matter is whether the Board 
of County Commissioners of Carbon County can fire an employee 
of the Sheriff's Office if they firmly believe such action 
should be taken and the Sheriff disagrees. The answer is 
simple: no. Both the Commissioners and the Sheriff are 
elected county officers, who function largely independently of 
each other, with powers and duties set forth by statute. A 
Sheriff is authorized to hire assistants, with the approval of 
the Commissioners, and having so hired an employee only the 
Sheriff can fire that employee. This Court has so held on 
three separate occasions. 
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The answer does not change because the Sheriff is felt 
to be "incompetent" or is thought to be having, or is having, a 
romantic relationship with his assistant. The powers and 
duties of county officers do not vary depending upon the 
quality of performance or "moral" character of the office 
holder• If an officer's conduct warrants removal, there is a 
statutory procedure to achieve that end. If his performance is 
thought to be adverse to the interests of good government, then 
the electorate will have its say. These are the recognized 
means for resolving disputes about who is, or is not, doing a 
good job in county government. Such disputes cannot be 
properly resolved by having one group of officers usurp the 
authority properly exercised by another. 
The certified question should be answered in the 
negative and the matter referred back to Federal District Court. 
DATED this Jy& day of CTLU^Z. , 1991. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
M. Dafvid E c k e r s l e y <£? 
A t t o r r i e y s f o r T ina McCourt 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the £>TA_ day of June, 1991, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following: 
Daniel M. Allred 
Thomas R. Grisley 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-9898 
1166d 
060591 
?y?. ^ L ^ / ^ L ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A D D E N D U M 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DANIEL M. ALLRED 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
ri:?TR!.-;T cuufiT 
'.'!STRICT OF UTjUU* 
. OCT 25 1989 
Nov 6 3 3fe pM c83 
os\"-ri n\ pfifJfiQE.OF CHIEF JUDGP 
1989 nFPUTY CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * 
TINA McCOURT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE SEMKEN, GUIDO RACHIELE, 
and WILLIAM KROMPEL, individu-
ally, and in their official 
capacity as the Board of Com-
missioners of Carbon County, 
CARBON COUNTY, and NORMAN 
PRICHARD, in his official 
capacity as Clerk of Carbon 
County, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATION ORDER 
Civil No. 87C-1052J 
* * * * * * * * 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, pursuant 
to Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, hereby certi-
fies the following question of law to be answered by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
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Do Utah Boards of County Commissioners have 
authority to discharge a probationary non-
deputy (non-sworn) subordinate employee work-
ing in the County Sheriff's office, when: 
(1) The subordinate performed dispatch-
ing services in support of the County 
Sheriff's law enforcement duties and in 
support of various services offered by the 
County and certain municipalities over which 
the County Sheriff had no responsibility. 
(2) The County Sheriff stated that he 
was satisfied with the subordinate's work 
performance. 
(3) The subordinate nevertheless was not 
competent to discharge her duties, and her 
actions and omissions constituted a threat to 
the safety of the citizens of the county and 
the Commission believed her actions created 
risks of liability to the county. 
(4) The County Sheriff (a) generally was 
not competent to discharge his duties, (b) 
had a romantic and sexual relationship with 
the subordinate though he was married to 
another woman, (c) was not honest with County 
and State officials regarding his personal 
relationship with the subordinate, and (d) 
refused to take action to terminate the 
employment of the subordinate or otherwise 
take action to remove the risks created by 
her acts and omissions. 
Pursuant to Rule 41(c)(l)(i)(ii) and (iii), the under-
signed represents that the certified question is a controlling 
issue of law in a proceeding pending before this Court and there 
appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Tina McCourtf a probationary employee of 
Carbon County who was working as a dispatcher/secretary in the 
Carbon County Sheriff's office, was terminated in the latter part 
of 1987 by the defendant Board of Commissioners of Carbon County 
for failure to competently discharge her duties as dispatcher. 
The Commission did so because her acts and omissions created 
risks to the safety of the citizens of Carbon County and created 
attendant risks of liability to the County. (Affidavit of Lee 
Semken, 1M 6,7.) 
2. The County Sheriff stated that he was satisfied 
with her work performance and refused to discharge her. (Affida-
vit of Barry Bryner, 1 4). 
3. The Carbon County Commission discharged plaintiff 
because of the Sheriff's refusal to do so. (Complaint herein, 
11 9). 
4. During the period that Tina McCourt was employed, 
roughly June to December, 1988, dispatchers located in the Carbon 
County Sheriff's office provided dispatching services for Carbon 
County as a whole and for a number of municipalities over which 
the Sheriff of Carbon County had no jurisdiction. In addition to 
providing dispatching services for the Sheriff's vehicles, 
dispatchers provided dispatching services for the Carbon County 
ambulance which was under the jurisdiction of the County 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission, the East Carbon ambulance, the Carbon County communi-
cations (audio) and TV trucks, both of which were under the 
jurisdiction of the County Commission, a rescue unit called 
Rescue 1 which was owned at the time by Carbon County and which 
was under the jurisdiction of the County Commission (although it 
may have been disbanded before plaintiff was employed), a rescue 
unit called Rescue 3 which was under the jurisdiction of Helper 
City, the Carbon County Mental Health Department which was not 
under the jurisdiction of the County Sheriff, the City of East 
Carbon, the Price City Police Department, the Wellington City 
Police Department, the Price City Fire Department, the Wellington 
City Fire Department, and the Helper City Fire Department. (Depo. 
of Jerry Cowan, the Chief Deputy Sheriff of Carbon County, pp. 
19-26). The dispatcher also provided dispatching services for 
the County's animal control service which was not under the 
control of the County Sheriff (Deposition of Barbara Kelly, p. 
13). 
5. The uncontroverted facts in the record relating to 
plaintiff's job performance are the following: 
(a) Deputy Sheriff Jerry Cowan, Tina McCourt's 
superior, worked with her daily on the same shift during the five 
or six months McCourt was employed in the Sheriff's office and 
observed her daily in the discharge of her duties as dispatcher 
(Cowan Depo., pp. 27-28). He was asked the questions: 
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Q. Over that time [June to December 1987] 
did you form an opinion based in your 
capacity as her supervisor as chief 
deputy of the sheriff of Carbon County 
whether she was discharging her duties 
in a competent fashion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's your opinion? 
A. She did not. She had a longer training 
period than any other dispatcher. By 
that I mean as she was sitting at a 
dispatch console, another back-up 
dispatcher was there to help or advise 
on what to do as far as paging the 
computer, that type of thing. She 
didn't seem to grasp it quickly enough, 
nor did she seem to have the desire for 
the job. She is the only dispatcher 
that I ever watched get up and leave 
that console, leave the dispatch room 
and mosey up and down the hallway. 
Q. And leave the dispatching phone 
unattended? 
A. Open, yeah. 
(Cowan depo., p. 28). 
(b) A call came in to plaintiff when she was on 
duty reporting vandalism and it took Tina McCourt two hours to 
dispatch a vehicle. This lapse of time was unacceptable accord-
ing to both McCourt's immediate dispatching supervisor, Barbara 
Kelly, and her more senior superior, Chief Deputy Cowan. (Depo. 
of Barbara Kelly, pp. 22-23, and Cowan Depo., p. 36 and Cowan Ex. 
2). 
-5-
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(c) She took ten minutes to dispatch a fire truck 
when she was required to dispatch it in seconds. The fire unit 
is prepared to leave within one and one-half to two minutes after 
receiving a call from the dispatcher. In this instance the fire 
unit arrived in about 14 minutes after the call was placed to 
Tina from the complainant. It took McCourt two and one-half 
times longer to place the call to the fire unit than it did for 
the fire unit to receive the call, leave its facility and arrive 
on the scene. (Depo. of Barbara Kelly, p. 19, Cowan Depo., pp. 
37-38 and Cowan Ex. 3). 
(d) Tina McCourt received a teletype from an 
out-of-state police department requesting assistance in locating 
an overdue motorist due in the City of Wellington in Carbon 
County. A vehicle description, the driver's name and a 
passenger's name were given. McCourt did nothing at all and the 
teletype was not noticed until the next dispatcher came on duty. 
According to Chief Deputy Cowan, she should have given this 
information to the Wellington City officer as well as to all 
County units in an attempt to locate the vehicle and individuals. 
The dispatcher who arrived following McCourt1s shift took the 
appropriate action. (Cowan Depo., pp. 39-40 and Cowan Ex. 4). 
(e) Tina McCourt received a call of a personal 
injury near East Carbon County. East Carbon is 30 miles away 
from Price. Rather than dispatching the East Carbon ambulance, 
-6-
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she incorrectly dispatched the ambulance from the City of Price, 
(Cowan Depo.f pp. 41-42 and Cowan Ex. 5). 
(f) If the four specific incidents referred to 
above had not occurred, Chief Deputy Cowan's opinion of her poor 
job performance would not have changed. (Cowan Depo.f p. 42). 
(g) Tina McCourt's immediate supervisor, Barbara 
M. Kelly, who was in charge of all dispatchers, was never con-
sulted by the Sheriff when McCourt was hired (Kelly Depo., pp. 
15-16). Following McCourt's employment, Mrs. Kelly believed that 
Tina McCourt did not discharge her duties properly. Patrolmen 
complained to Mrs. Kelly that Tina McCourt would not do security 
checks on them after they had been out of their vehicle five or 
six minutes. (Kelly Depo., p. 30). 
6. After Mrs. Kelly wrote out a poor evaluation of 
McCourt's work performance (Exhibit 1 to Cowan's deposition) 
Kelly was demoted by the Sheriff from her supervisory position 
(Kelly Depo., p. 25); the Sheriff put her on three different 
shifts a week (two graveyards, two afternoons and one day) with 
the shifts rotated all the time (Id. at 33); she received phone 
calls in which she was told she would lose her job if she testi-
fied against McCourt [in a January, 1988 state court proceeding]; 
and a vehicle attempted to run her off the road (Kelly Depo., pp. 
33-34). 
-7-
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7. Tina McCourt, who was 19 years old (McCourt Depo.f 
p. 3)# had a romantic and sexual relationship with the Sheriff of 
Carbon County (a married man of 40), during the period she was 
employed in the dispatcher's office. She became pregnant with 
the Sheriff's child, (Depo. of Informant No. 4, pp. 24-25). As 
early as July, 1987, one month after she was hired as dispatcher, 
she was fearful that she was pregnant with the Sheriff's child. 
(Informant No. 4 Depo.f p. 36). 
8. She traveled overnight with the Sheriff to Kane 
County, Salt Lake City, Park City, and Vernal. She went to some 
of these places with the Sheriff more than once. (Depo. of 
Informant No. 4, pp. 11-28). She spent two or three nights in 
the same bedroom with Sheriff Bryner at the home of Sheriff 
Gonzales of Kane County. (Depo. of Joseph T. Gonzales, pp. 7-8). 
9. After she was employed as dispatcher, Sheriff 
Bryner unilaterally designated her as his personal secretary. 
(Although the Carbon County Commission had only approved her as 
dispatcher. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Facts, 11 2). She 
would frequently spend long periods locked up with the Sheriff in 
his office over the period of her five or six months employment. 
The Chief Deputy never saw any evidence that she had performed 
any secretarial duties during the time she spent alone with the 
Sheriff. (Cowan Depo., pp. 44-45). Over the five to six month 
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period she typed perhaps a total of four letters for the Sheriff 
and she opened his mail. These were the only duties she per-
formed of a secretarial nature for the Sheriff. (Cowan Depo., p. 
45). 
10. The dispatcher provides the public's access to 
emergency services. Tina McCourt's conduct raised the risk in 
the minds of the Commission and the Deputy Sheriff that those 
emergency services would be denied to the public when needed and 
Sheriff Bryner would not do anything to correct these risks even 
though he received complaints about Tina McCourt's performance. 
(Cowan Depo., pp. 31-32; Affidavit of Lee Semken). 
11. Plaintiff was discharged by the Carbon County 
Commission on November 23r 1987. (Affidavit of Lee Semken, 11 7). 
12. On January 5, 1988, Judge Boyd Bunnell, District 
Court Judge for the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon 
County, State of Utah, granted an ex parte temporary restraining 
order against plaintiff, restraining her from entering the 
Sheriff's dispatch center and operating or otherwise handling the 
dispatch equipment of the Carbon County Sheriff's office in 
Price, Utah. (A certified copy of the temporary restraining 
order is attached to Notice of Filing of Certain Pleadings from 
Related State Court Action). 
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13. On February 1, 1988, Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins 
of the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
denied plaintiff McCourt's motion for preliminary injunction. 
14. From March 8 to March 11, 1988, a special audit 
team created by the Commissioner of the Utah State Department of 
Public Safety conducted an investigation of 14 separate allega-
tions made by the Carbon County Commission against the Sheriff of 
Carbon County and also investigated the Sheriff's allegation that 
the Carbon County Commission was interfering with the discharge 
of his duties. The audit team was composed of Clyde Palmer, 
Director, Utah Peace Officers Standards and Training which acted 
as the Chairman of the audit team, Sheriff Bob Limb, Box Elder 
County Sheriff's Office, representative from the Utah Sheriff's 
Association, and Sharon Esplin, a special investigator, Utah 
Attorney General's Office. The audit team interviewed some 30 
witnesses in Carbon County and later issued a written report 
entitled "Final Report Fact Finding Audit", a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Sharon Esplin. On its 
last page, the report concludes, second to last paragraph: 
To put it simply and succinctly the Sheriff 
does not have the present capability to 
manage his operation and those deficiencies 
have been exacerbated by Commission actions 
which have, with some justification, intruded 
upon the traditional prerogatives of an 
independently elected official. 
-10-
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The audit team also concluded on the seventh unnumbered page of 
its report, under FINDINGS, that the Carbon County Sheriff was 
not truthful about certain out-of-office contacts he had with 
plaintiff Tina McCourt. 
• * * * 
This C e r t i f i e d Order i s accompanied by a copy of the 
docke t ing s h e e t in t h i s c a s e . 
ENTERED t h i s < 3 day of floOeryrbo^, 1989 . 
pies mailed to counsel 11/21/89: mw BY THE COURT: 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Daniel M. Allred, Esq. 
HONdRABLEy^RUCk S. JENKINS 
DISTRICT/COURT DGE 
The parties by their respectivecounsel approve the 
foregoing order as to form and content. 
M. David Eckersley^^' 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
irriel M.' Allred^ 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Carbon County 
220-.101389A 
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CAUSE TITLE i+2 SEC. 1983 
PLAINTIFFS 
TINA McCOURT 
r- OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS 
6605
 o7i-1 c fjfljeaj 
DEFENDANTS 
LEE SEMKEN, GUIDO 
RACHIELE, and WILLIAM 
KROMPEL, individually, 
and in their official 
capacity as the Board of 
Commissioners of Carbon 
County, CARBON COUNTY, and 
NORMAN PRICHAR, in his 
capacity as Clerk of 
Carbon County, 
r - 1 CHECK 
1 1 HERE 
IF CASE WAS 
FILED IN 
FORMA 
PAUPERIS 
M. IDAVTD ECKERSLEY 
HOUPT &^ECKERSLEY 
419 Boston^Bviilding 
S a l t Lake CityV Utah 84111 
M. David Eckers ley , Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South 
Ci ty Centre I , S u i t e 900 
SLC 84111 
524-1000 
ATTORNEYS 
FILING FEES PAID 
DATE RECEIPT NUMBER 
Paul A. Kirk, Esq. 
P. 6 : -Box 572 
Provo, UT 84603-0572 
375-2550 
NICK ZAMPINOS 
CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CARBON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PRICE, UTAH 84501-3092 
Danie l M. A l l r e d , Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. O. Box 11898. 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84147-08^8 
532-1234 for Defs. 
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1 tb COMPLAINT fi led, assigned to the Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
PLTF's Mot/Prelim Inj 
PLTF's Memo In Suppt of Mot/Prelim Inj 
NOTICE of Hrg on Mot/Prelim Inj set for 2/1/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc: attys 
Cams Before Crt for Mot for Pre/Inj. Arguments of cnsl heard re who is authorized 
to terminate employee. The Crt DENIED the mot, suggesting that cnsl, if interested,! 
fornulate the question relative to "pcwer" for the State Supreme Court's consideration, 
and this Crt will then review the matter. Cnsl have one week in which to do it. 
DEFS1 Memo In Suppt of Mot/Dism 
DEFS' Mono In Oppos to Pltfs Mot/Prelim Inj 
DEFS1 Cert of Svc of Doc #6-7 
NOTICE OF Hrg on settlemt of from of Order of Reference to State Supreme Court 
set for 5/20/88 @10:30 A.M. cc: attys 
STIP MOT/for continuance of Hrg on Certification of issue to Utah Supreme Crt 
ORDER BSJ 5/20/88 continuing hrg on Mot/to Certify to 6/8/88 at 1:30 P.M. cc: attys 
NOTICE of Appear by Daniel M. Allred, Esq. for defs 
NOTICE of W/drawal of csl by Paul A. Kirk, Esq. as csl for defs 
PLTF's Mot/Partial Sumn. Judgnt. 
PLTF's Memo In Suppt of Doc #14 
AFF of Barry Bryner 
DEF's Notice of filing of certain pleadings from related state court action 
AFF of Sharon Esplin 
DEF's Notice of w/drawal of Memo In suppt of Mot/to Dism 
AFF of Paul M. Warner 
DEFS1 Memo re: And. Certification Order 
DEFS1 Answer 
Came before the court on not/consider form of order. Defs cnsl states he wants 
this action dism w/prej, however, cnsl also requests sch conf, the filing of 
findings of fact & conclusions of law and resolving the issue as to whether 
this matter should be certified to the Utah Supreme Court. Pltfs filed mot/sunm 
jdgmt St feels there is no need for disc. Court states pltfs mot/summ jdgmt 
will be set to be heard in due course. Defs cnsl represents to court that they 
are not interested at this time in certifying this matter to the Utah State 
Supreme Court. Court set disc cut-off date - 9-9-88; post disc motions to be 
filed by 9-26-88 & motions to be heard by 10-21-88. Final pretrial conf set 
for 10-28-88 at 1:30 p.m. Sch order to be prepared by Mr. Eckersley 
( 
/ 
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CIVIL DOCKET CONTINUATION SHEET 
PLAINTIFF 
TINA McCOURT 
DEFENDANT 
LEE SEMKEN, et al DOCKET NO 
C-87- 1052 
PAGE OF PAGES 
DATE NR. PROCEEDINGS 
6/10/88m* 24 NOTICE of Hrg on Pltfs Mot/Parial Surom Judgnt set for 7/15/88 at 8:30 A.M. 
cc: attys 
6/10/88nto 25 PEF's Amd. Answer 
6/15/88mL 26 
7/14/88r(w 27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
7/20/88m| 
8/4/88nJ 
8/8/88nrt 
8/9/88nJ 
8/15/88mL 
J/19/88mj 
3/19/88ml 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
l/22/88m^  41 
l/22/88n*| 
B/24/88nJv 
J/30/88 
42 
43 
lc 44 
STIP/for continuance of Hrg on Pltf 's Mot/SJ from 7/15/88 to 8/10/88 @8:30 A.M. 
SO ORDERED BSJ 6/17/88 cc: attys 
DEFS' Mot/Summ. Judgmt. 
DEFS' Memo In Oppos to Pltfs Mot/Partial SJ & in Suppt of Their Mot/SJ 
AFF of Lee Semken 
AFF of Daniel M. Allxed 
DEFS' Cert of Svc of 1st Req/Prod 
NOTICE OF Hrg on Defs' Mot/SJ set for 8/10/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc; attys 
PLTFS' Reply Memo in Suppt of Pltfs Mot/for Sumnru Judgnt. & in Oppos to Defs1 
Mot/for SJ 
NOTICE of change of Address of M. David Eckersleyr Esq. 
STIP/ORDER BSJ 8/3/88 allowing defs to 7/15/88 to file Memo In Cppo to Pltfs 
Mot/SJ & Pltfs have to 8/3/88 to file Reply cc: attys 
STIP/ORDER BSJ 8/8/88 continuing hrg on Mots/SJ to 8/30/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc: attys 
DEFS1 Reply Memo In Suppt of Mot/for Partial SJ 
PLTF's Mot/for Protective Order & Supptg Menu 
DEF's Mot/to Conpel Disc & Supptg Memo 
DEF's Notice of Depo of Bill Flink, 8/19/88 
DEF's Notice of Depo,of Barry Bryner, 8/25/88; Tina McCourt, 8/25/88; Jeral Cowan 
8/25/88; Barbara Kelly, 8/25/88 
RETN/subp on Bill Flink, 8/19/88 
DEF's Notice of Depo of Lyla Grogan, 8/26/88; Sheriff Joe Gonzales, 8/26/88 
Came Before Crt for Defs Motion for Sum/Jdgmt; Pltfs Mot for Sum/Jdgmt 
and Defs Mot to Conpel. Arguments heard. The Court, with reference to 
qualified inrnunity, GRANTED the notion as far as the Corrndssioners are 
concerned. The Court RESERVED on remaining notions. 
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CIVIL DOCKET CONTINUATION SHEET 
1NTIFF DEFENDANT 
DOCKET NO. 
PAGE OF_ .PAGES 
( 
nx NR. PROCEEDINGS 
l/88n|w 45 
46 
I8mw 
88nw 
47 
48 
( 
f8Ski> 49 
'89m* 50 
>-89 
'89kJ 
89kd 
7/89hw 
/89kk 54 
|sw 5l| 
52 
53 
DBFS' Addl Statement of Facts In Oppos to Pltf's Mot/for Partial Summ. Judgnt. 
STIP/regarding Depositions, ORDERED BSJ 9/2/88 Court nay rely on unsigned copies df 
depos re: Mots/Partial SJ & sealing identity of Informant #4 cc: attys 
DEF's And. Mot/to Conpel Disc 
RETN/subp on Barbara Kelly, 8/23/88; Barry Bryner, 8/23/88; Jeral Cowen, 8/23/88 
[DEPOSITION OF KATOY ANN ANDERSON, 8/25/88 
DEPOSITION OF JERRY COWAN 8/25/88 
DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH T. GONZALES, 8/25/88 
DEPOSITION OF BARBARA M. KELLEY, 8/25/88 
DEPOSITION OF MM. L. FLINK, 8/19/88 
Came before the court on 8/22/88 on a mot/carpel disc. Args of counsel were hrd 
a discussion was held. Court indicated to counsel that it cannot make a prematur^ 
ruling at this point. Counsel nay proceed with the taking of the depos. If the 
matters cannot be resolved, Court will hear apprqp mots of counsel. 
STIP/MOT/ORDER BSJ 9/2/88 extending disc cutoff tO 10/21/88, Post Disc Mots due 9/|26/88 
to be hrd by 10/21/88, Final PT set for LO/28/88 @1:30 P.M. cc: Attys 
NOTICE Re: Status & Sched Conf set for 8/10/89 @ 1:30 PM cc: cnsl 
Stat rpt hid. Cross nots/SJ pendg. S & S conf set for 9/20, 1:30 P.M. (RF, CR) 
S & S conf hid. Cnsl to start cert of ques for Supreme Crt. Hrg set for 10/17/89 
1:30 P.M. (RF, CR) 
DEPOSITION OF INFORMENT NO. 4 - SEALED 
Stat rpt hid. Cnsl to start by Eri a final doc, signed by all cnsl, containing 
the ques to be certified. (RF, CR) 
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